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Propagated since the early 1980s, and developed on the economic adaptation of what Hayek
(1960) labeled as “the constitution of liberty,” President’s Ronald Reagan perception of the
“magic of the marketplace” grew into a worldwide consensus known as the “Washington
Consensus.” Articulated and adopted by the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, the tenets of the “Washington Consensus” uphold the principles of deregulation; pri-
vatization; and the free setting of prices (such as wages) in competitive markets (Galbraith
2003, p. 8). Broadly deﬁned, the principles emphasize investments in education, job training
and freedom from government regulation and control. At the outset, these principles are to
serve as a template for future political and economic guidelines.
Brieﬂy, it is generally understood and frequently applied in practice, that the Washington
consensus means a redeployment of resources and a redeﬁning role of existing - as well as
creating new - institutions. The Washington c o n s e n s u si se m e r g i n ga saw e l l - a c c e p t e da n d
deﬁned path for policy, that is, economic freedom provides a Pareto improving framework
and approach for economic prosperity. Criticism to this consensus has led to a resurgence in
interest to deﬁne and understand the inner workings of economic freedom and the political
economy.
Many theoretical questions arise with limited answers. At the core, one question stands out,
‘How does economic freedom (reforms) 1 inﬂuence the economy?’ What is paradoxical in
this policy-making process is the following. How can one support and most importantly how
1 Given the deﬁnition of economic freedom index (see the Appendix), we use the term ‘economic
freedom’ and ‘economic reforms’ interchangeably.
2can one convince other countries to adopt the consensus without reference to a structural
model? There exists no analytical model that investigate the qualitative and the quantitative
aspects of the interdependence between economic freedom and the aggregate behavior of the
economy, in the short or long run. In the literature, most studies - if not all - address
t h ei s s u ea n dt h en a t u r eo ft h er e l a t i o n s h i pa tt h ee m p i r i c a ll e v e l .B a s e do na d - h o cc a u s a l
relationships and a limited set of long-run stylized facts, conclusions are drawn and policy
recommendations are made without reference to a structural model that encompasses this
interdependence.
What is at odd and often controversial, is that most empirical research in economics identify
and test for a causal relationship from economic freedom to economic growth (uni-causal),
while that empirical research in political sciences 2 emphasize the causal relationship from
the latter to the former.
In this paper, we attempt to juxtapose the separate strands of this diverse literature by
proposing a model which enhances our understanding of the contribution that economic
freedom makes to the business cycle. To overcome the theoretical shortcoming in the liter-
2 Although, we acknowledge the importance of political freedom and that various aspects of free-
dom are related (see Dawson (2003)) - in this paper - we conﬁne ourselves to the space of economic
freedom and economic activity. Ali and Crain (2002) investigated the eﬀect of economic freedom and
political freedom on growth. They concluded that political regimes do not matter for growth. Here,
we abstract from the issue of political freedom. Also, there exists a large body of empirical evidence
that concludes a negative relationship between Social and Political Instability (SPI) and investment.
In general, periods of SPI are characterized by a negative impact on investment and growth due to
the destruction of some capital stock and the interruption of otherwise well-functioning production
processes. In most of these studies, the question of causality was rarely addressed. Campos and Nu-
gent (2003) investigated the causality between SPI and the rate of investment across 94 developing
countries. Surprisingly, they concluded the existence of a Granger-causality relationship between
SPI and investment, but it is a robust positive relationship and speciﬁcally strong in low-income
countries. Again we limit the model to abstract from SPI.
3ature, we integrate economic freedom into a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model
to investigate the contentious nature of the circular causal relationship.
Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 reports the business cycle stylized facts for Egypt
and its relation with economic freedom. Section 4 outline the proposed model, reports the
results and a discussion. Section 5 advances extensions to the proposed model. And, ﬁnally,
Section 6 concludes.
2 Review of Literature
Empirical studies addressed and documented a strong correlation between economic free-
dom and economic growth. For example, Gwartney, Lawson, and Holcombe (1998, p. 26)
concluded that, “There is a strong and robust relationship between increases in economic
freedom, and economic growth. This relationship is present even after measures of physical
and human capital are taken into account.” Dawson (2003) investigated these correlations
and used the Granger-causality test to test for causation. The results suggest that the over-
all level of economic freedom appears to cause growth, while changes in freedom are jointly
determined with growth.
In many instances in the literature, economic freedom is perceived as less regulated insti-
tutions. 3 Few have framed the discussion and linked economic freedom to the nature of
institutions. A correlation between institutions and economic growth is well documented
3 An institution is not merely an organization or establishment for the promotion of a single or
particular objective, like a school, a union or a federal reserve bank. It is also an organized pattern
of group behavior, well-established and accepted as a fundamental part of the culture.
4(see Knack and Keefer 1995, Mauro 1995, La Porta, Lopez-de-Salines, Shleifer and Vishny
1998, De Haan 1998, Hall and Jones 1999). North (1990) emphasized the importance of
institutions that shape the incentive structure that directly inﬂuences the productive ca-
pacity within society. Hall and Jones (1997, p. 173) concluded that “diﬀerence in levels of
economic success across countries are driven primarily by the institutions [our emphasis]
and government policies that frame the economic environment in which people produce and
transact.”
Recently, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2003) and Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson
and Thaicharoen (2003) resurrected and revived the institutionalist school without reference
to the ‘circular causation.’ They documented a thorough empirical investigation of the uni-
causal relationship between institutions and macroeconomic volatility - from the former to
the latter. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2003, p. 17) concluded “that institutional
diﬀerences across countries are a fundamental determinant of economic and political insta-
bility.” Their studies concluded with an open call for further research into the how and
the why of this interrelated causal eﬀect. In this paper, we attempt to answer the call by
proposing a model that captures the how does such causal relationship exist.
As for the relationship between economic freedom and well-being, a growing body of ev-
idence seems to suggest that economic liberty is indeed important and necessary for the
enhancement of economic well-being. Farr et al. (1998) concluded that a circular causation
exists between economic freedom and economic well-being. Their study concluded that eco-
nomic freedom signiﬁcantly Granger-cause the level of economic well-being for both industrial
and nonindustrial countries. Also, the level of economic well-being is shown to signiﬁcantly
5Granger-cause economic freedom. This causality analysis suggested the presence of a feed-
back mechanism that is embedded in the functioning of the economy. Again, few have framed
the well-being within the institutional perspective. For example, Wolfers (2003, p. 3) sug-
gested that “...establishing the right institutional frameworks is the key to higher levels of
happiness.”
3 The Egyptian Experience
Egypt has the largest population and the second largest economy in the Arab world. In 2000,
GDP totaled $78 billion of 1995 US dollars. Per capita GDP stood at $1,226. Since 1991, the
government seriously questioned and eﬀectively - to some degree - addressed the question
of how to abandon the vestiges of the old dirigiste economic system. At a variable pace,
many measures were implemented to ease the transition towards a system that emphasizes
economic freedom and production over diversion.
Figure 1 illustrates the Egyptian business cycle. 4 The standard deviation of real GDP per
capita is 3.77 percent and 1.81 percent over the consecutive periods 1950 to 1990 and 1991 to
2000, respectively. Prior to 1991, the business cycle was three times more volatile relative to
the period of post-reforms starting in 1991/1992. Figure 2 graphs the business cycle and the
index of economic freedom for Egypt. A simple graphical inspection reveal milder recessions
associated with increases in the index of economic freedom. Following the implementation
4 All variables are in log form and detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. The data covers
the period from 1950 to 2000, except for the Employment series, which covers the period from 1970
to 2000. Real GDP per capita (1996 Constant) and Capital are from the IFS databank, labels:
46999B and 46993E, respectively. The Employment series is from the ILO databank. Consumption
and Investment are taken from the World Penn Tables, labels: CKON and IKON, respectively.
6of a series of measures aimed to reform the economy in 1991/1992, and as a result of both
macroeconomic stabilization and the reallocation of resources from unproductive sectors to
productive ones, output declined in the initial years of transition. This is similar to the same
stylized fact that is observed in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe
(Fischer and Sahay (2000)). Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of capital over the business
cycle. Capital is strongly procyclical and more volatile (as much as three times) than GDP.
Subramanian (1997) reported that the year 1991/1992 marked the beginning of reforms
that were undertaken by the Egyptian government. These reforms mainly focused on: ﬁscal
stabilization, interest rates liberalization, disinﬂation, exchange stabilization and structural
reforms to remove price distortions. Current account improved from a deﬁcit of 5 percent
to a surplus of 1.1 percent (see Figure 4). GDP steadily increased and reached a 5 percent
growth by 1994. Inﬂation sharply fell from 21 percent to 7 percent. The following Table
summarizes the cyclical characteristics of the Egyptian economy.
Table 1: The Cyclical Behavior of the Egyptian Economy, 1970-2000.
Volatility relative to Output Cross Correlation of Output with
Variable x (% Std. Dev) x(t − 1) x(t) x(t +1 )
Real GDP 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.86
Employment 0.40 -0.53 -0.45 -0.26
Capital 3.09 0.78 0.78 0.69
Investment 3.03 0.78 0.73 0.58
Consumption 0.56 0.09 0.35 0.52
According to the World bank, Egypt’s weighted tariﬀ rates were reduced. The weighted av-
e r a g ea n n u a lr a t eo fi n ﬂation from 1992 to 2001 dropped to 2.55 percent. The government
embarked on a multi-dimensional legislative privatization plan. Investment laws were enacted
that allow 100 percent foreign ownership without a pre-incorporation approval. Approval is
automatic in speciﬁc sectors. Other provisions included: the guarantee against conﬁscation,
7sequestration and nationalization; the right to own land; the right to maintain foreign cur-
rency bank accounts (for foreign and non-foreign residents); freedom from administrative
attachment; the right to repatriate capital and proﬁts; and equal treatment regardless of
nationality. The economy witnessed the removal of price controls except for pharmaceutical
goods, cigarettes, rationed edible oil and rationed sugar.
Private property rights are protected by the constitution. Delays and ineﬃciencies in the
legal system are often cited. A commercial case could be resolved in six years and appeal
procedures allow many cases to be unsettled beyond 15 years. With a heavy involvement in
the labor market, the state dominate the economy. In 2000, government expenditures stood
at 31.4 percent of GDP. 5
On the other hand, there is still much room to improve. Egypt’s tax income rate is relatively
high. The corporate tax rate is 40 percent and the marginal rate for the average tax payer is 27
percent. Regarding privatization, some companies were ‘oﬀ limits’ 6 while others that deemed
‘strategic’ 7 were allowed a 40 percent cap on privatization. The purchase of agricultural land
is not allowed to foreigners and prior approval from the cabinet is required for any investment
project in the Sinai region. New bank formation is restricted. Energy and basic foods prices
are supported by government subsidies. The multiplicity of regulatory agencies and high
market entry transaction costs are major impediments to a sound and eﬃcient economy.
5 Source: The African Development Bank report.
6 The ‘oﬀ limits’ companies are Egypt Air, The Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation and the
Suez Canal.
7 ‘Strategic sectors’ companies include pharmaceuticals, ﬂour mills and telecommunications.
84 The Model
The purpose of the model is to integrate economic freedom into a standard stochastic dy-
namic general equilibrium model. We conﬁne the model to a closed economy setup. In de-
veloping countries, we argue that domestic shocks are the main driving forces for business
cycles ﬂuctuations. 8 The economy is characterized by a large number of identical consumers.
The single consumer is assumed to be representative 9 of the society as a whole. Represen-
tative agents’ preferences are represented by a utility function which is time separable in



















kt+1 =(1− δk)kt + it (3)




0≤ρ ≤ 1, ln(εt) v iid N(µ, σ
2)( 6 )
ct + it ≤yt (7)
lt + nt ≤1( 8 )
where the discount factor β is contrained to 0 <β<1, the momentary utility is U(ct,l t)=
8 See for example, Hoﬀmaister and Rold` os (2001) wherein they concluded that domestic shocks
are at the source of business cycle ﬂuctuations in Brazil and Korea. Although the results does not
imply that the same will hold true for Egypt, we adopt the closed economy to understand the eﬀect
of economic freedom on the cost of business cycle. The model presented here, can be adapted for
an open economy framework.
9 For an excellent and comprehensive development of the representative agent in macroeconomics
modeling, refer to Hartley (1997).
9lnct + γ lnlt, is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave.
This log speciﬁcation of the utility implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal
to one.
mt refers to the index of economic freedom. 10 The core ingredients of economic freedom
are personal choice, protection of private property, and freedom of exchange. Individuals
have economic freedom when: (a) property acquired without the use of force, fraud, or theft
is protected from physical invasions by others and (b) such property can be freely used,
exchanged, or given to another as long as the owner’s actions do not violate the identical
rights of others. 11
Output is a function of economic freedom - or in other words, institutional eﬃciency ztmt.
The inclusion of other input factors (here, mt) in the production function is without prece-
dence. Production is indivisible as in Edgeworth (1911) and Lerner (1944). Azariadis (1993,
p. 232) proposed a production function H(Kt,Lt,A t)w h e r eAt denoted intangible but a
variable factor of production such as the stock of useful knowledge. Also, originally due to
Rosentein-Rodan (1943) and formulated by Murphy et al. (1989), At w a sc o n s i d e r e da sa
function of government spending on infrastructure. Given the Cobb-Douglas shape of the
production function, κ refers to the elasticity of output with respect to economic freedom.
The aggregate production function (Equation (2)) exhibits increasing returns in economic
freedom to capture the stylized fact presented in Figure 5. As for individual ﬁrms, there
10 Many researchers attempted to measure economic freedom (Gastil 1982, Scully and Slottje 1991,
Johnson and Sheehy 1995, and 1996, Gwartney, Lawson and Block 1996). Outgrown of a series
of conferences at the Fraser Institute and the Liberty Fund, Gwartney, Lawson and Block (1996)
provided the most comprehensive index to measure economic freedom.
11 For the development of and the computation of the index, see Gwartney and Lawson (2003).
10are N ﬁrms. Each representative ﬁrm takes m = mt/N as given. The representative ﬁrm
production displays a constant returns to scale with α + η =1 , and π(mt)=mt.E q u a t i o n
(3) refers to a standard law of motion for capital, where investment is irreversible (it ≥ 0)
and capital depreciates at the rate δk.
Equation (4) describes the accumulation of economic freedom over time. This equation is
what identiﬁes the variable ‘economic freedom’ and mak e si td i s t i n c tf r o ma n yo t h e rf a c t o r
input. The second part of the equation, encompass the circular causation from output to
economic freedom. Assume that φ
0(yt) > 0a n dφ
00







(yt)=0 . For the model here, we choose φ(yt)=y
ψ
t , where 0 <ψ<1, to ensure the
concavity of the inﬂuence of per capita GDP on economic fr e e d o m .W i t hf u l ld e p r e c i a t i o n
(δm =1 ) ,ψrefers to the elasticity of economic freedom with respect to output. Empirically,
recent cross-section research in political sciences pointed to and emphasized the role and the
direction of causality from output to economic freedom. This causality is captured by the
inﬂuence of φ(yt)o nmt+1. Also, the concavity is chosen to conform with the cross-country
empirical stylized facts (see Figure 5, page 34, reprinted from O’Driscoll et al. 2003, p. 20).
Intuitively, as deﬁned and measured in the literature, economic freedom is an index, i.e., it is
a bounded variable. Therefore, we abstract from linear functions of output (e.g., φ(yt)=yt).
For simplicity, we assume that the relative price of one unit of output relative to one unit
of economic freedom equals to one. Otherwise, and assuming that the price of one unit of
output equals 1, equation (4) will be modiﬁed as such mt+1 =( 1− δm)mt + y
ψ
t /pm, where
pm is constant and denotes the price of one unit of economic freedom.
Subjected to (a stochastic shock zt) an improvement in economic freedom, the model prop-
11agates the eﬀect and describes the inﬂuence on the economy. First, a note on the impulse
is due. We assume that the shock (institutional eﬃciency) is brought on or imposed by the
World Bank and/or the International Monetary Fund for loan purposes, for example. zt
refers to factors (such as institutions changes) that impinge on productivity not stemming
from diﬀerences in technology (Romer (2001, p. 8)).
As for how does the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) inﬂuence zt, we
assume that is it done through the credit channels. Boockmann and Dreher (2003) analyzed
the eﬀect of World Bank and IMF policies on the composite index of economic freedom - as
measured by Gwartney et al.(2000) - as well as its sub-indexes, using a panel of 85 countries
observed between 1970 and 1997. With respect to the World Bank, they found that the
number of projects has a positive impact on overall economic freedom, while the eﬀect of
the amount of World Bank credits is negative. Their study concluded that there is no clear
relationship between credits and programs of the IMF and economic freedom as measured by
the index. Here, for simplicity, we assume that there is one. Equations (7) and (8) complete
the model by imposing the resources and time constraints, respectively.
Note that if ψ =0 ,κ=0 ,δ m =0a n dmt = mt+1 = m (∀t), then the proposed model
reduces to a standard real business cycle model.
The social planner solves the following Bellman equation, subject to the above constraints,
v(nt−1,k t,m t|zt)= m a x
(nt,kt+1,mt+1)
{lnCt + γ ln(1 − nt)+βEtv(nt,k t+1,m t+1|zt+1)} (9)




























































































































Combine the FOC with the constraints to form the rational expectation system,





t +( 1− δk)kt (15)






logzt+1 =(1− ρ)logz + ρlogzt +l n ( εt)( 1 7 )


































































Cct + Kkt+1 − Yy t − (1 − δk)Kkt =0 (22)
Mmt+1 − (1 − δm)Mmt − ψY ψyt =0 (23)
yt − κzt − κmt − αkt − ηnt =0 (24)
zt+1 − ρzt − εt =0 (25)
The log-linearization of γ(1 − nt)−1 follows as, 1 − nt = lt, using lt instead of nt lead to
L−1 exp(−lt) ≈ L−1(1 − lt)=( 1− N)−1nt.
13We solve and simulate the model with sensitivity to the structure following Uhlig (2001,
p. 38). The log-linearized system is solved using numerical rational expectations. 12 The
calibrated parameters are chosen to ensure that the capital to output steady state value
matches the sample data. The following Table reports the calibrated parameters used to
generate the impulse responses,
Table 2: The Calibrated Parameters
βκ α η δ k δm ψρ
0 . 9 91 . 50 . 30 . 70 . 0 60 . 0 50 . 30 . 7
Given the lack of time series data on economic freedom, there is no single point estimate
12
Write the log-linearized system as,
0=Axt + Bxt−1 + Cyt + Dzt
0=Et [Fxt+1 + Gxt + Hxt−1 + Jyt+1 + Kyt + Lzt+1 + Mzt]
zt+1 =Nzt +  t+1 Et [ t+1]=0
where xt denotes the state vector, yt refers to the jump variables and zt refers to the exogenous
ones. It is assumed that N has only stable eigenvalues. Using Theorem 3.2 in Uhlig (2001, p. 38),
we solve for the recursive equilibrium law of motion
xt =Pxt−1 + Qzt
yt =Rxt−1 + Szt
To compute the P,Q,R and S matrices, we solve,
0=C0AP + C0B




Ik ⊗ AI k ⊗ C












given that all eigenvalues of P are less than unity in absolute value. We choose the root(s) manually.
C+ denotes the pseudo-inverse of C. C+ =( C0C)−1C0. C0 ≡ (null(C0))0. The C0 is found by
singular value decomposition of C0. Note that C0C =0 .
14for the elasticities parameters for Egypt, κ and ψ. We address this issue by calibrating the
model with diﬀerent set of points for these parameters.
4.1 Results and Discussion
We measure the welfare of the representative household using the discounted sum of the
momentary utility as in Lucas (1987). Lucas (1987) initiated the literature emphasizing the
evaluation cost of business cycles. He reported that the welfare cost associated with elim-
inating consumption ﬂuctuations stood at 0.05% of permanent consumption. Many others
investigated the merits of the welfare costs associated with the business cycle. Among many,
˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (1989) showed that these costs are three to ﬁve times higher than reported by
Lucas. Shiller (1997, p. 22) reported a survey wherein 80% of Americans agree with the state-
ment that preventing recessions is as important as preventing drug abuse. Wolfers (2003)
examined the eﬀects of business cycle volatility on well-being. The study concluded robust
evidence that high inﬂation and unemployment lower perceived well-being. Eliminating un-
employment volatility beneﬁted well-being and accounted for a similar eﬀect of lowering the
average level of unemployment by a quarter of a percentage point.
Diﬀerent approaches have been pursued to study the cost of business cycle volatility on
welfare. The approach used by Lucas (1987) was theoretical, by Shiller (1997) was based
on a survey and by Wolfers (2003) was empirical, using data on self-reported happiness and
macroeconomics conditions.
Since the representative consumer is representative of the society, a change in the level of
15her utility reﬂects and is equivalent to a change in the overall level of social welfare. That
is, an increase (decrease) in her utility 13 implies an improvement (loss) in social welfare.
Here, we answer the following question. By how much does welfare improve or decline when
institutional eﬀectiveness increases by one percent? Our simulation suggest that the welfare
gains from increasing institutional eﬀectiveness of one percent, equals to 1.37 percent in terms
of permanent consumption. In other words, this welfare increase translates to an increase of
$E 93.36 Egyptian pounds per person per quarter. 14
Figure 6 illustrates the impulse response for capital following a shock to institutional eﬃ-
ciency under three diﬀerent rates of time preferences (β ∈ {0.1,0.5,0.9}). T h em o r ep a t i e n t
the representative consumer is, the stronger the inﬂuence is on capital of an improvement
in economic freedom. The results of the impulse response suggest that an improvement in
economic freedom is futile if the representative household has a high rate of time preference
(i.e., impatient). For a patient household, the eﬀect is an increase in capital that peaks after
one year of the shock, and lasts for three years.
Figure 7 illustrates the impulse response for capital following a shock to institutional eﬃ-
ciency under three diﬀerent rates of elasticities of output with respect to economic freedom
(κ ∈ {1.0,1.5,2.0}) The impulse response shows that the eﬀect on capital is strictly in-
creasing and almost one-to-one to the value of the elasticity. The eﬀect on capital doubles
with the value of the elasticity. The lack of suﬃcient time series data on economic freedom
makes it relatively diﬃcult in practice to estimate this coeﬃcients from sample data. An
13 The actual numerical value of utility is irrelevant. A change in the utility level provides a measure
of the direction of welfare change.
14 This gain is computed as the quarterly average - over 7 years - of the discounted value of the
momentary utility.
16interesting empirical research agenda should include an investigation of the determinants of
this elasticity. The eﬀect peaks at ﬁve quarters and lasts for seven years.
The model could be perceived as a return to the Institutionalist School. It emphasizes the role
of institutions in economic life and advocates th a th i g h e re c o n o m i cf r e edom can mitigate the
sharp swings of the business cycle (see subsection 5.1). The focus of the model is on ‘how does
institutional eﬀectiveness interact and contribute to economic eﬃciency?’. However, unlike
the old-institutionalists, this model does not condemn laissez-faire, but embraces it. Also,
the model provides a role for the government to adopt higher levels of economic freedom.
5E x t e n s i o n s
The model proposed here is ﬂexible enough to serve as a basis for a multitude of interesting
and viable extensions. In this section, we suggest a selective host of these extensions.
5.1 Economic Freedom and BC depth/duration
Edwards et al. (2003) analyzed the behavior of the stock markets in six emerging countries.
They found that cycles in emerging countries tend to have shorter duration and larger
amplitude and volatility than in developed countries. Here, prior to 1991, the Egyptian
business cycle was three times more volatile relative to the period of post-reforms starting
in 1991.
T h ep r o p o s e dm o d e li ns e c t i o n4c o u l db ea d a p t e dt oi n v e s t i g a t et h em e r i to fs u c has t y l -
17ized fact. We address the depth of the cycle at the impulse level and the duration at the
propagation level.
Assume that cycles are caused by technology shocks At, and let lnAt+1 =( 1− θ)lnA +
θlnAt + εt, where εt is a white noise. Let ∆zt =1 /Bt, and 0 <B t ≤ (∆At)
1/κ where the
ratio 1/Bt is deﬁned as the business cycle absorption factor due to the presence of eﬀective
institutions. 1/Bt will absorb part of the general shock to the production capacity. In this
setup, higher institutional eﬀectiveness will cushion the depth of recessions. Also, if θ is an
increasing function of m, then a lower steady state level of economic freedom (as observed
in transition economies) will result in shorter duration of cycles. As the economy acquire
higher levels of economic reforms, its cycles are trading depth for duration.
5.2 Convex-Concave Technology
The model is ﬂexible to accomodate an output that is convex-concave in economic freedom.
Diﬀerent levels of economic freedom yield diﬀerent levels of output. Most previous growth
studies were limited to the narrow class of concave production function. The concavity of
the production function is a good approximation for well-developed countries, wherein the
capital-labor ratio is high. For less developed countries, this concavity is not applicable. At
early stages of industrialization, returns to scale are increasing and the production function
becomes concave at a higher level of economic activity. Figure 8 illustrates the ordinary least
squares regression line of the logarithm of output on the logarithm of employment. The slope
estimate is 1.07. If all movements of employment and output are attributed to movements
along a ﬁxed production function, then this coeﬃcient would be an unbiased estimate of the
18slope of the production function. The value of 1.07 causes one to doubt the assumption of
diminishing returns for labor.
To solve for the model with a convexo-concave production function, Skiba (1978) initiated the
study of convex-concave production function in continuous-time optimal growth models. The
maximum principal of Pontryagin applies well to concave technology. Whenever technology
is non-concave, the Mangasarian’s theorem on the suﬃciency of the Pontryagin’s conditions
is not valid. By using a derivative of the Arrow maximum principle, these mathematical
diﬃc u l t i e sw e r eo v e r c o m eb yS k i b a( 1 9 7 8 ) .
Alternatively, one can argue that (or the quantity of) output is the same across diﬀerent
freedom regimes - as in Djankov et al. (2003, Figure 1, p. 8). In this latter case, economic
freedom must play the role of providing higher output quality, that is, the production function
will include an interaction term between economic freedom and product quality. 15 We ﬁnd
it diﬃcult to accept such an argument. Such an argument imply that a dirigiste system does
provide the same incentives for its workers to produce the same exact (in terms of quantity
and quality) output as the one produced in a free system.
Therefore, as an extension, we propose that for κ>1, 0 <α<1a n d0<η<1, the ﬁrm
production function (Equation 2) to be strictly increasing and convex-concave in mt with
π(m)=−m3+(3/2)m+(1/12)m. We normalized m to be bounded between [0,1] and there
exists a point mI =0 .5 such that π
00(m) < 0i fm>m I and π
00(m) > 0i fm<m I.
For such a problem, an optimal path exists. The problem is equivalent to a maximization
15 For product quality in endogenous growth models, see Grossman and Helpman (1991).
19problem of a continuous function on a compact set by using the product topology deﬁned on
the space of inﬁnite sequences of real numbers. To prove the existence of the optimal paths
of capital and consumption, see Le Van and Dana (2003, p. 40) for the details.
5.3 Jumps in Economic Freedom
In continuous time, one can re-write the model in a deterministic optimal control framework
wherein economic freedom takes on discrete values (and hence the term ‘jump’). Suppose that
the state variable m has a jump at time τj ∈ [t0,t 1]. Let m(τ
+
j ) denote the right-hand limit of
m(t)a tt i m eτj, and m(τ
−





j ) are the values of the state variable m before and after the jump, respectively. The
magnitude of the jump is then m(τ
+
j ) − m(τ
−
j ). Assume that the number k of jumps points
as well as the locations of the jump points τ1,...,τk in the interval [t0,t 1] are controlled by
the social planner. The planner controls the magnitude of the jumps at τj by choosing a
control jump parameter vj =( v1,...,vk),v j ∈ V ×{ 0} ⊂ Rk, and the set V is convex. Also,
assume that the magnitude of the jump depends explicitly on the τj and the state of the
system immediately before the jump. Formally,
m(τ
+





j,τj) j =1 ,...,k (26)
with g(m,v,t):R1+k+1 → R, and g(m,0,t) = 0 for all m and t. g(m,v,t) is continuous and
g ∈ C2. Note that if the magnitude of the jump is independent of the state of the system






j )) as in Arrow and Kurz (1970, p. 52).
20Between the jumps the system evolves according to
• mt = −δmmt + φ(yt)( 2 7 )
Also, one can include a cost that is associated with each jump. Such a cost divert resources
from production and consumption towards providing the necessary framework to sustain
economic freedom. These costs include - but are not limited to - the direct costs imputed
from changing: the legislative system and the infrastructure, as well as indirect costs, such
as menu costs needed to implement the legislative changes. Formally, let h(m(τ
−
j ),vj,τj)
denote this cost, with h(m,v,t):R1+k+1 → R, and h(m,0,t)=0f o ra l lm and t. h(m,v,t)
is continuous and h ∈ C2. Also, if the costs are independent of the state of the system before




j ) − m(τ
−
j )).








j,τj)( 2 8 )
Let xt denotes the vector of the state variables, and ct denotes the vector of the control
variables. Assume that xt and ct are left continuous in [t0,t 1],Uis well-deﬁned and C2 in
(0,∞).U 0 > 0a n dU00 < 0o n( 0 ,∞). lim
c→∞U0 =0a n dl i m
c→0U0 = ∞. Then the problem reduces










 = f(xt,c t,t)( 2 9 )
•
kt =−δkk + yt − ct (30)







with π(kt)=kt. A solution to this problem exists. The proof is done by modifying the
Filippov-Cesari Theorem of existence of an optimal control.
Theorem [Filippov-Cesari] Consider the optimal control problem (28). Assume that,
A1. There exists an admissible pair (xt,c t),
A2. fi(x,c,t) is non-decreasing in x and concave in c for i =1 ,2,
A3. U is convex,
A4. There exist piecewise continuous functions a(t)a n db(t), such that
k fi(x,c,t) k≤ a(t) k xi(t) k +b(t)f o ra l l( x,t), c(t) ∈ R+,
Then there exist an optimal pair (x∗(t),c ∗(t)) that solves the optimal control problem.
The necessary condition for this problem are given by Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987, Theo-
rem 7, p. 196). What is of interest in this exercise, is the derived result regarding the eﬀect
of the rate of time preference on the behavior of the economy - as articulated in the basic
model in Figure 6. Sbika (1978), Majumdar and Mitra (1982) and Dechert and Nishimura
(1983) proved 16 that for an interval of values of the discount factor, the economy converges
16 The model of Dechert and Nishimura (1983) has been adapted, in continuous time, for a de-
veloping country facing foreign debt (Askenazy and Le Van (1999)) and, in discrete time, for a
22to a “poverty trap”. If the economy exhibits a low discount factor, then it converges to a zero
steady state (the so-called “trap”). For intermediate values of the discounting parameter,
there exists a critical value of the initial stock below which the optimal path converges to
zero, and above which, it converges to a positive steady state.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a basic theoretical model to integrate economic freedom into a
stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model. The aim was to assess and enhance our un-
derstanding of the eﬀects of an increase of economic freedom on the short-run characteristics
of the economy. Such a model provides a structural approach and a viable ground for the
argument leading to the adoption of the Washington consensus. To show how ﬂexible the
model is to adapt, we also proposed a set of extensions that stem from the basic model.
Conditioned on the calibrated parameters, the results show that a one percent increase in
the economic freedom index leads to a welfare improvement that is equivalent to an increase
in consumption of $ E 93.36 Egyptian pounds per person per quarter. This increase in
economic freedom brings an increase in capital that peaks at ﬁve quarters and lasts for a full
seven years. The increase in capital is dependent onto the value of the elasticity of output
with respect economic freedom. However, the increase in economic freedom is worthless if
the representative household possesses a high rate of time preference (i.e., impatient).
developing country facing debt, corruption and R&D (Dimaria and Le Van (2002)).
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277A p p e n d i x :
Components of the Index of Economic Freedom (7 areas/25 factors)
1. Size of Government: Consumption, Transfers, and Subsidies [11.0%]
A General Government Consumption Expenditures as a Percent of Total Consumption
(.500)
B Transfers and Subsidies as a Percent of GDP (.500)
2. Structure of the Economy and Use of Markets (Production and allocation via govern-
ment and political mandates rather than private enterprises and markets ) [14.2%]
A Government Enterprises and Investment as a Share of the Economy (.327)
B Price Controls: Extent to Which Businesses Are Free to Set Their Own Prices (.335)
C Top Marginal Tax Rate (and income threshold at which it applies) (.250)
D The Use of Conscripts to Obtain Military Personnel (.088)
3. Monetary Policy and Price Stability (Protection of money as a store of value and
medium of exchange) [9.2%]
A Average Annual Growth Rate of the Money Supply during the Last Five Years minus
the Growth Rate of Real GDP during the Last 10 Years (.349)
B Standard Deviation of the Annual Inﬂation Rate during the Last Five Years (.326)
C Annual Inﬂation Rate during the Most Recent Year (.325)
4. Freedom to Use Alternative Currencies (Freedom of access to alternative currencies)
[14.6%]
A Freedom of Citizens to Own Foreign Currency Bank Accounts Domestically (.335)
B Freedom of Citizens to Maintain Foreign Currency Bank Accounts Abroad (.357)
C Freedom to Convert Domestic Currency to Foreign Currencies in Order to Engage in
Current and Capital Account Transactions (.308)
5. Legal Structure and Property Rights (Security of property rights and viability of con-
tracts) [16.6%]
A Legal Security of Private Ownership Rights (Risk of conﬁscation) (.345)
B Viability of Contracts (Risk of contract repudiation by the government) (.339)
C Rule of Law: Legal Institutions, Including Access to a Nondiscriminatory Judiciary, that
Are Supportive of Rule of Law Principles (.317)
6. International Exchange: Freedom to Trade with Foreigners [17.1%]
A Taxes on International Trade
28i Revenue from Taxes on International Trade as a Percent of Exports plus Imports (.214)
ii Mean Tariﬀ Rate (.227)
iii Standard Deviation of Tariﬀ Rates (.117)
BN o n - t a r i ﬀ Regulatory Trade Barriers
i Percent of International Trade Covered by Non-tariﬀ Trade Restraints (.198)
ii Actual Size of Trade Sector Compared to the Expected Size (.105)
CD i ﬀerence between the Oﬃcial Exchange Rate and the Black Market Rate (.139)
7. Freedom of Exchange in Capital and Financial Markets [17.2%]
A Ownership of Banks: Percent of Deposits Held in Privately Owned Banks (.271)
B Extension of Credit: Percent of Credit Extended to Private Sector (.212)
C Interest Rate Controls and Regulations that Lead to Negative Interest Rates (.247)
D Restrictions on the Freedom of Citizens to Engage in Capital Transactions with Foreigners
(.271)
Note: The numbers in the brackets, e.g. [11.0%], indicate the percentage weight allocated
to each area when the weighted summary rating was derived. The numbers in parentheses,
e.g. (.500), indicate the weights used to derive the area rating. These weights are derived by
principal component analysis.
29The Egyptian Business Cycle
























Figure 1. The Egyptian Business Cycle



























































Figure 2. The Business Cycle and Economic Freedom

























Figure 3. Capital and the Egyptian Business Cycle.
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33Figure 5. The World and Economic Freedom.(Source: 2003 Index of Economic Freedom, p. 38)












Figure 6. Impulse Response Capital - β ∈ {0.1,0.5,0.9}














Figure 7. Impulse Response Capital - κ ∈ {1.0,1.5,2.0}
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